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NO. 18 APRIL 2020 Introduction 
Brexit: A Pragmatic Trade Agreement? 
Time Is Tight But Deal Remains Possible 
Bettina Rudloff and Evita Schmieg 
The negotiating mandates for the next round of Brexit talks are on the table. The 
European Union is making talks on a deal regulating EU/UK trade from 1 January 
2021 conditional on reaching a fisheries agreement first – originally by July, although 
the precise timetable may be derailed by the corona crisis. The negotiating mandates 
diverge in significant respects: The European Union wants to safeguard its Single 
Market with its strong, shared regulation. That is also reflected in its recently pub-
lished draft proposal for a trade deal. The United Kingdom seeks liberation from EU 
trade rules. These differences are substantial, and significant compromises will be 
needed if the talks are to be brought to a successful conclusion. Intelligent prioritisa-
tion and structuring could allow resolution of certain details to be postponed until a 
later date. 
 
External trade and the internal market are 
communitised policy areas in the European 
Union. This makes them central issues for 
the British, as they seek to “reclaim their sov-
ereignty”. Here – to a much greater extent 
than in areas such as foreign and security 
policy – Brexit has enormous ramifications 
for legislation and implementation. These 
are tough and time-consuming matters to 
negotiate. The further the United Kingdom 
seeks to diverge from the status quo, the 
harder it will be to complete the talks with-
in the year. 
The joint Political Declaration of October 
2019 sketches the outlines of the future 
relationship between the European Union 
and the United Kingdom: Both sides envis-
age a comprehensive free trade agreement 
(FTA) and broad cooperation in various 
sectors. In principle this should also include 
regulatory matters and cover services as 
well as goods. However, now that the nego-
tiating mandates (and the EU’s initial offer) 
are on the table, it is apparent that signifi-
cant differences remain to be bridged. 
Different Starting Points 
Both sides published their negotiating man-
dates at the end of February. According to 
the British document, London wants an 
agreement “on the lines of the FTAs already 
agreed … with Canada and with other 
friendly countries”, with an Australian-style 
relationship as its fall-back. Given that the 
EU trades with Australia on WTO terms, 
the latter is a euphemism for a hard Brexit 
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without a trade agreement. In many areas 
the British mandate orientates on the EU’s 
existing bilateral trade arrangements. 
The EU’s mandate lays out its objectives 
and outlines the issues it believes need 
to be addressed. As well as many familiar 
demands, the draft proposal for a trade deal 
contains a number of new elements. 
The EU is seeking the closest possible 
trade partnership with the UK. But it also 
has fundamental principles it wants to see 
safeguarded. Brussels is willing to grant 
tariff- and quota-free access only in return 
for acceptance of all four freedoms of the 
Single Market. It should be noted that the 
kind of completely free access the UK imag-
ines is something EU does not even offer 
to its closest partners in the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA), but only to developing 
countries (see Table on page 4). 
The EU’s strict approach to risk and regu-
lation is also central. The precautionary 
principle is internationally contested, but 
entrenched and valued in European soci-
eties. The EU seeks to anchor it in new 
trade agreements, as occurred to a limited 
extent in the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. It 
is unclear whether London also wishes to 
retain this principle; explicitly named in 
the mandate it is not. 
The EU emphasises the “level playing 
field” in its talks with the UK, the idea 
being to guarantee fair terms of competi-
tion. The term and objective are a novum 
in trade talks, and underline the special 
nature of the UK’s economic relationship 
with the EU. The “playing field” includes 
subsidies and tax policy as well as product 
standards. 
Diverging overall priorities aside, par-
ticular sectors and issues will be especially 
problematic. The Table on page 4 shows 
examples of solutions already applied by 
the EU. 
Agreement on Fisheries as 
Condition for Further Talks 
The EU is making completion of a fisheries 
agreement by July 2020 a precondition 
for further talks on a trade agreement. The 
issues at stake are the future distribution 
of fishing rights and access to British waters 
for EU-based fishing vessels. 
In course of the 1980s the Common Fish-
eries Policy (CFP) transformed national 
access and fishing rights. Rights to fish are 
governed by an EU-wide licencing regime, 
under which fish stocks are treated as a 
common European resource. Total permis-
sible long-term catches are defined on the 
basis of scientific research and concretised 
as annual quotas. These are shared among 
EU member states under the principle of 
“relative stability”, which guarantees fair-
ness even where total catches have to be 
reduced – for example for the sake of sus-
tainability. 
The EU wants to keep this system, on 
account of the political sensitivity of the 
issue and widely diverging interests be-
tween member states. The UK has now put 
a new idea on the table: catches should be 
shared on the basis of where the fish stocks 
live (“zonal attachment”). This would grant 
the UK larger catches, but create a risk of 
overfishing. The UK also wants to reclaim 
control over access to its waters. That con-
tradicts the EU’s principle of “equal access”. 
The EU’s desire for stable long-term plan-
ning also clashes with London’s wish for 
annual decisions on access and quotas. 
Access rights and quotas are closely inter-
twined. For example even if access rights 
are granted to a large number of vessels, 
low national quotas can still limit the total 
catch; this kind of issue therefore needs to 
be clarified jointly and strategically. 
Brexit affects access and fishing rights 
in three geographical contexts, all of which 
need to be negotiated from scratch: (1) Euro-
pean access to British waters, in which 
more non-British than British vessels cur-
rently operate (including the distribution 
of quotas); (2) British access to European 
waters (and quotas), which today account 
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for 13 percent of the total British catch 
(110,000 tonnes annually); (3) British fish-
ing fleets’ access to international waters 
and fish stocks, which is currently governed 
by the EU’s participation in regional fish-
eries agreements (for example for tuna), 
under which the UK receives a share. The 
disagreement is thus not only – as much of 
the British reporting would have it – about 
protecting British fish stocks from Euro-
pean rivals, but also about European and 
international fisheries in which the UK has 
an interest. 
Border Controls Are Inevitable 
The United Kingdom wants to quit the EU’s 
Single Market and Customs Union. That 
means border controls for goods and rules 
of origin to prevent the misuse of prefer-
ence schemes. This in turn incurs not in-
significant costs for state administration 
and the private sector. Customs posts will 
have to be rebuilt and maintained indefi-
nitely. According to the British National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(2018), the resulting costs and smaller trade 
flows will leave British per capita GDP 3 
percent lower than before Brexit (£1,000/ 
year). Even if the UK remained in the Cus-
toms Union, the reduction in per capita 
GDP would still be 2 percent. It is currently 
conceivable that the impact of the corona 
crisis may overshadow the repercussions 
of Brexit, and that the “Brexit effect” will 
never become properly apparent. The con-
fluence of the two developments certainly 
creates great problems for the UK. 
Northern Ireland Protocol Creates 
Additional Difficulties 
While Great Britain (GB) will cease to be 
part of the EU’s Single Market on 1 January 
2021, Northern Ireland will remain within 
it. All checks on goods will be conducted at 
the points of entry between Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. 
This arrangement for Ireland and North-
ern Ireland is defined in a protocol to the 
Withdrawal Agreement. It was introduced 
in order to protect the 1998 peace settle-
ment (the Good Friday Agreement), which 
is predicated on abolition of the physical 
border. That situation is to be preserved. 
The new customs border between the Euro-
pean Union and the United Kingdom will 
therefore run between Northern Ireland 
and the British mainland, not between Ire-
land and Northern Ireland – the latter 
being the national (political) border. This 
applies whatever trade agreement is con-
cluded. Northern Ireland’s regional par-
liament will have the right to review the 
arrangement every four years. 
At the same time Northern Ireland will 
form a single customs area with the rest of 
the United Kingdom and as such participate 
in future British trade policy. British tariffs 
can be applied to goods from third coun-
tries, as long as there is no risk of them 
entering the EU through Northern Ireland. 
The British authorities will apply EU tariffs 
to goods destined for the EU. In other words, 
from 2021 Northern Ireland will belong 
to two trade regimes simultaneously. Dual 
membership of trade regimes – complete 
with different tariffs and standards – is 
a known phenomenon in Africa. Such a 
situation is practicable where controls at 
the borders ensure that the rules of the 
relevant end market are observed. The 
problem in this case is that there must be no 
new border between Northern Ireland and 
Ireland. 
That creates a conundrum for any trade 
agreement between Brussels and London, 
because it will be difficult to verify and 
control goods entering the European Union 
from Northern Ireland. It is currently un-
clear how this can be resolved. Exports 
from the British mainland to Northern Ireland 
will not need to be controlled or restricted 
when they pass through the entry points. 
Once they reach Northern Ireland the goods 
will – under the terms of the Withdrawal 
Agreement – (as today) already be within 
the European Single Market, within which 
the EU undertakes no border controls. The 
UK on the other hand has the ability to con-
trol all goods crossing from Northern Ireland 
SWP Comment 18 
April 2020 
4 
Table 
EU models for tariff-free access and regulatory coordination 
Field  Examples of models used in practice 
Free trade Tariff- and quota-free 
market access 
∎ Least Developed Countries (LDCs): Everything But Arms (EBA) 
∎ African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states: Economic Partner-
ship Agreements (EPAs) 
 Deep coverage: goods, 
services, capital 
∎ Canada: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) 
 Tariff-free market access, 
but certain sectors excluded 
∎ European Economic Area (EEA) (Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway): agriculture and fisheries excluded  
∎ Euro-Mediterranean association agreements (Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia) 
 Sectoral tariff reduction 
agreements 
∎ Switzerland: bilateral agreements, with linkage clause 
∎ United States: limited agreement planned 
Regulation WTO and WTO plus ∎ WTO: harmonisation of sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
(SPS standards) 
∎ WTO+: sustainability chapter in newer free trade agreements 
(FTAs) 
 Voluntary cooperation ∎ Canada: chapter on regulatory cooperation (in CETA) 
∎ WTO cooperation guidelines 
 Adoption of all EU 
regulations 
∎ EEA with exception of agriculture and fisheries  
∎ Switzerland in scope of mutual recognition  
∎ Partnership countries: Euro-Mediterranean association 
agreements, association agreements with Eastern Partnership 
countries: (flexible) acquis communautaire 
 Unilateral equivalence ∎ New Zealand: veterinary agreement  
∎ Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, India, Israel, 
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, Tunisia, 
United States: equivalence agreements for organic products 
∎ 15 agreements for financial services 
 Mutual recognition ∎ Canada: mutual recognition in specific sectors, 
for example medical products (in CETA) 
∎ Japan: mutual recognition in specific sectors, 
for example motor vehicles 
∎ Switzerland: mutual recognition of conformity assessments 
Fisheries Access and fishing rights ∎ Within EU free access with principle of “relative stability” 
for quotas 
∎ 20 agreements with African and Pacific states: access and 
quotas negotiated 
∎ EU membership of 17 regional fisheries management organi-
sations: access and quotas negotiated 
∎ Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Norway: bilateral agree-
ments on reciprocal access, with annual adjustment 
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to the British mainland. In other words the 
concerns about subversion of standards and 
rules of origin are the EU’s alone. In prac-
tical terms, the GB/NI checks might be based 
on whether the imported quantities cor-
respond roughly to what the Northern Ire-
land market consumes. That is not a robust 
arrangement. The EU’s negotiating man-
date mentions the idea of mutual recogni-
tion of Authorised Economic Operators as 
another option, but that is far from being 
actionable. 
Limits on the UK’s Regulatory 
Independence 
The global importance of non-tariff meas-
ures has grown considerably, with their im-
pact today estimated to represent 1.6 per-
cent of global GDP. Between OECD states 
tariffs themselves are currently less than 
3 percent. Trade agreements today therefore 
focus on harmonisation or mutual recog-
nition of standards and regulations. But this 
is harder to negotiate than tariffs on goods: 
non-tariff measures comprise a wide range 
of different instruments from procedural 
requirements through labelling rules to 
thresholds (for example for pesticides). They 
are politically sensitive, touching as they do 
on social and public preferences and on the 
different administrative traditions and sys-
tems of the countries involved. 
Even if the UK does not accept any new 
EU standards from 2021 it will only be 
reclaiming a small sliver of its regulatory 
sovereignty. This is because WTO rules 
define in great detail a multitude of health-
related standards such as pesticide residues 
in food or hygiene requirements in process-
ing. Other standards are generally based on 
international compliance and certification 
rules. So there will be little national leeway 
there either. This applies in particular to 
standards that cannot be controlled directly 
in the product itself when it crosses the bor-
der (see SWP Comment 49/2014). Bilateral 
agreements can also affect the treatment of 
product standards in individual sectors (see 
Table on page 4). Examples of mutual recog-
nition of certification systems include the 
agreement between the EU and Japan (for 
motor vehicles) and CETA (for medical 
products). The EU also unilaterally recog-
nises the certification processes of various 
third states for organic products. 
It is by nature difficult to define 
how future changes in standards will be 
handled. Although the chapter on regulato-
ry cooperation in CETA has a similar thrust 
(as did the abortive talks on a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP), 
both refer only to information exchange 
and coordination. Brussels is of course well 
aware of London’s concern to assert sover-
eignty over regulatory matters, having itself 
experienced such concerns in association 
with the aforementioned negotiations. 
Because the European Union wishes to keep 
a closer trade relationship with the United 
Kingdom than it has with North America, 
it is seeking mechanisms to allay those 
fears when dealing with future divergence 
in standards (the level playing field). 
Aside from the political question of 
harmonisation or recognition of standards 
between Brussels and London, powerful 
market mechanisms are also at play. The 
standards applied in the EU’s very large 
market – with more than 500 million con-
sumers – are strict in international com-
parison. Suppliers seeking to serve the EU 
market frequently orientate their entire pro-
duction on those standards, it not being 
worthwhile to maintain separate product 
lines for smaller markets with different or 
lower standards. The EU’s de facto domi-
nance of international standards may be 
watered down in future as Asia – and in 
the longer term Africa too – continue to 
gain in importance. But in the medium 
term the UK will have to orientate on EU 
standards. 
The Role of Trade Negotiations 
with Third Countries 
London wishes to conclude its own free 
trade agreements, independently of the 
European Union. Here a distinction must 
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be drawn between two cases: Firstly, the UK 
is a party to forty-two EU FTAs, for which 
it needs to negotiate successor agreements. 
In about half of these cases – mostly with 
smaller partners – this has already occurred. 
These successor agreements are relatively 
easy to negotiate, because the central pro-
visions can be taken from the EU’s FTAs. 
But the UK is highly unlikely to achieve 
better market access than the EU enjoys, 
because many of EU’s existing agreements 
(for example with Canada, Japan, Vietnam) 
contain so-called most-favoured-nation 
clauses. These require the respective part-
ner to offer the EU the same trade terms for 
goods and services that it grants to other 
industrialised countries (in future including 
the UK). This could prove especially prob-
lematic for the British financial sector, 
where the UK hopes for greater openness 
and benefits from agreements with third 
countries. In 2018 the UK’s trade in goods 
and services was estimated at £1.4 trillion, 
11 percent of which was accounted for by 
countries with which the EU has trade 
agreements. 
The instrument of agricultural tariff 
quotas used in many EU agreements creates 
problems for the UK with partners in the 
WTO and for future bilateral trade agree-
ments. Tariff quotas restrict tariff reduc-
tions and/or exemptions to defined quan-
tities of the respective product. Brexit sees 
the UK’s large market for agricultural 
products, which has to date accounted for 
a significant proportion of imports under 
these quotas, removed from the EU. Now it 
must be decided how they are to be divided. 
The EU and UK have presented their WTO 
partners with a joint proposal for adjusting 
the total of 142 quotas covering 400 tariff 
lines with a trade value of €28 billion (2018): 
Under it the historic British share would 
be defined as a separate UK quota and sub-
tracted from the EU quota. But many states, 
including Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States, object that separating the UK 
from the EU market reduces overall sales 
and increases their producers’ costs for par-
allel import licences. They insist on larger 
British quotas, which British farmers reject 
on the grounds that this would expose 
them to greater competition. The EU’s bi-
lateral quotas will remain unchanged in 
existing agreements, making them relatively 
larger for the now smaller EU market and 
increasing pressure on farmers. The UK 
should renegotiate on a case-by-case basis. 
Secondly, the United Kingdom will be 
able to conclude completely new agree-
ments after Brexit, for example with India 
or the United States. Indeed, 40 percent of 
British trade is with countries with which 
the EU has no FTA, including the United 
States as the United Kingdom’s most im-
portant single trading partner. The UK has 
high hopes for these agreements, placing its 
faith in free trade and assuming that it will 
be able to make attractive offers to its part-
ners. On the basis of good historical rela-
tions, London hopes for good access to Com-
monwealth countries and the United States. 
But the Commonwealth partners’ depend-
ency on and interest in the British market 
has shrunk in the wake of shifts in world 
trade and the growing importance of the 
emerging economies. Theresa May’s initial 
talks with India in 2016 were not terribly 
promising. And it is highly unlikely that 
the United States under Donald Trump will 
be ready to make especially generous trade 
concessions to the UK. Ultimately, the UK 
will find itself facing the same problems as 
the EU did in prior negotiations on sensitive 
issues, for example if Washington demands 
access to the British market for genetically 
modified crops such as maize. 
2020 Deadline Demands 
Pragmatic Approaches 
Negotiating a trade agreement usually takes 
many years; CETA required seven. Unless 
a request to extend the transition period is 
lodged by 30 June 2020 – which the UK 
has excluded by law – the end of 2020 will 
be a cliff-edge for completing the trade talks. 
Even without the timetable being derailed 
by the corona crisis that is very tight – and 
even tighter for a fisheries agreement by 
July 2020. 
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Today the EU has forty-two trade agree-
ments (including bilateral and regional 
economic partnership agreements), whose 
scope has grown steadily over time. The 
newer so-called deep and comprehensive 
agreements include regulatory topics that 
affect internal policies such as intellectual 
property protection or competition policy, 
as well as trade in goods and services. But 
the concrete shape of these can vary very 
widely. For example some exclude certain 
sectors, while others in contrast coordinate 
regulation only within particular spheres. 
These agreements contain modules on 
which the provisions of the future UK-EU 
FTA can be orientated (see Table on page 4). 
Under a pragmatic approach the nego-
tiating agenda can be stripped down and 
compromises achieved within the time 
available. Some of these are floated in the 
EU’s draft proposal from March: 
Alert and Governance Mechanism for 
Regulations. Detailed talks on rules and 
standards can be postponed until a later 
date and thereby left dormant until rules 
actually diverge in practice. Reliable noti-
fication of relevant changes would be essen-
tial, as proposed for a level playing field for 
state aid in the article on “New acts or pro-
visions in the area of State aid control”. 
A neutral instance would be established 
to determine whether such a case has 
occurred; it would also have to be able to 
sanction violations. The two sides would 
then either agree on a harmonisation, or 
decide to impose border controls and im-
port rules for the products in question. In 
many cases this would permit agreement 
on standards to be pushed back into the 
implementation phase. 
(Temporary) Focus on Specific Sec-
tors. New import tariffs could remain 
limited to particularly sensitive sectors, as is 
the case with fish in the EEA. This would 
reduce the scope of the negotiations. Under 
a “negative approach” to regulation, one 
could start by excluding politically sensitive 
and symbolic sectors such as food from 
general coordination. This would publicly 
demonstrate London’s regulatory sovereign-
ty. On issues such as environmental and 
social standards the EU’s draft proposal 
insists on the rigid principle of “non-
regression”, in the sense of not falling 
below existing standards. One conceivable 
compromise would be mutual recognition 
of standards in particular areas – where 
agreement appears easier or where very 
dynamic developments mean that diver-
gence is likely to occur sooner. 
Tie market access for fish to fishing 
rights. Fishing rights are especially impor-
tant for the UK, and highly symbolic despite 
the sector’s small overall economic impor-
tance: It accounts for 0.1 percent of British 
GDP and employs 12,000 fishing crew and 
14,000 processing workers, principally in 
Scotland. But it is also relevant in certain 
regions of the EU. For example, fish pro-
cessing is a major employer in the German 
Baltic port of Saßnitz – and almost entirely 
dependent on German herring catches 
in British waters. The UK’s abundant fish 
stocks represent a significant bargaining 
chip. The EU should exploit its dominance 
of the demand side of the equation, given 
that it takes 70 percent of all British fish 
exports. If agreement is not reached, a 
relatively high WTO tariff on fish of up to 
26 percent can be imposed, which would 
potentially reduce sales. The EU should 
therefore make continued tariff-free access 
for British fish products conditional on 
the EU continuing to receive fishing rights 
in British waters. But it is questionable 
whether these rights would correspond to 
the status quo as the EU desires. The EU 
should also underline more clearly than 
to date that the UK could lose its access 
and fishing rights in European waters and 
would have to negotiate its own access to 
international waters. Such an arrangement 
would especially benefit Scotland, where 
a majority voted Remain but which is also 
home to most of the UK’s pro-Brexit fishing 
communities which stand to benefit from 
more international catches and secure 
access to the EU’s markets. British proces-
sers themselves emphasise the importance 
of preserving tariff-free market access. 
The proposed negotiating deadline – 
assuming it survives the corona crisis – is 
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extremely tight. But the starting situation 
is favourable compared to other negotiating 
processes. All earlier trade talks have been 
about reducing tariffs – on hundreds of 
lines – and harmonisation or mutual rec-
ognition of different sets of rules. In the 
case at hand, after forty-eight years of Brit-
ish membership of the EU and its prede-
cessors, what London and Brussels need to 
decide is whether new tariffs are to be intro-
duced and if they are, on which products, 
and to what extent hitherto uniform rules 
will be permitted to diverge. That means 
the need for negotiations is smaller than 
in other cases. Concretely: The further the 
new agreement diverges from the present 
situation of free market access with iden-
tical rules, the more complicated the nego-
tiations will be and the longer they will 
take. 
Almost half of British trade (49 percent) 
is with the EU. So the UK has a vital interest 
in open trade relations. In the other direc-
tion, the UK’s share of the EU’s external 
trade is only 13 percent. So the scales are 
skewed in the EU’s favour. Nevertheless the 
European Union should show willingness 
to compromise: It also has its own interest 
in sustainable development and stability in 
its partner countries, especially those in the 
immediate neighbourhood. And it would 
be a good thing if it were possible for the 
UK to remain a valuable partner – and not 
only with an eye to future British genera-
tions potentially being more interested in 
closer relations with the EU. 
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